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In anticipation of President Bill Clinton's visit to Hamilton, the Arthur Levitt Public Affairs Center sponsored a panel discussion on the successes and failures of his administration on Nov. 8. Featuring economics professor Ann Owen, government professors Steve Orvis and David Rivera, and moderated by history professor Doug Ambrose, the panel talked about the Clinton administration's policies in the realms of economics, humanitarian intervention, and the reconstruction of Russia.

Professor of Economics Ann Owen, a former Federal Reserve economist, spoke about the economy of the Clinton years. Undeniably, she said, the economy of the 1990s was very good, with real GDP growing consistently, the national debt being reduced, and the existence of a balanced budget. There was also productivity growth, low inflation, and a decrease in interest rates. The question, however, is whether the robust economy of the Clinton era was good luck or good policy. Owen said that it was "a little bit of both." Also, she pointed out, a part of good economic policy is not standing in the way of any good luck that you get. The decrease in federal budget deficits, for example, was a combined result of a strong economy gaining more revenue for the government and of the government showing fiscal restraint in not spending it. In terms of monetary policy, Clinton reappointed Greenspan and appointed other talented economists to the Federal Reserve Board, and then stepped back and allowed the board and the bank to be independent, which Owen said has been shown to help these institutions effectively administer monetary policy.

These areas were both successes for Clinton, she said. The adminstration failed, however, to effect any significant reform in the areas of health care or social security, Owen said. Welfare reform could also be considered either a success or a failure depending on one's expections and measures of success - while there was an overall decrease in poverty levels, the poorest people in America got even poorer. Overall, while Clinton was at times criticized by both the left and the right, and experienced several failures, Owen called the economic policy of his administration an overall success.

Steve Orvis, professor of government and an expert in the politics of Africa, discussed the Clinton administrations various interventions (or lack thereof) into civil wars and humanitarian crises. He started by saying that the foreign policy picture of the Clinton years was not as pretty as that of the economy. However, this was not particularly Clinton's fault in Orvis's opinion, since no one else in the American government had considerably better ideas for dealing with these issues. Clinton was president during the post-Cold War era, in which the United States had no clear enemies, no clear strategy, and no definite foreign policy doctrine other than the vague idea of spreading "market democracy" around the world. Therefore, when civil wars and humanitarian crises erupted around the world, the United States did not know what our role should be.

There were five such major episodes during the Clinton administration, and Orvis addressed each of them. The first, Somalia, was a situation that Clinton inherited from the first Bush administration which quickly went bad and lead to the famous "black hawk down" incident. The Somalia situation led the United States to be much more reluctant to commit its troops to intervene again. Therefore, when the Bosnian War heated up, the United States did not send its troops to be part of the UN force, but rather was instrumental in the negotiation of the Dayton Accord peace settlement that put an end to the violence by bifurcating Bosnia. In Rwanda, the United States and other UN troops were pulled out as the violence got worse. This lead to the infamous genocide of Tutsis by Hutus, a huge refugee crisis, and eventually the Congolese civil war. President Clinton later apologized for not having done anything to stop the genocide, and called it one of his great regrets. In Haiti, the US intervened to restore the duly elected government, which unfortunately later became more and more authoritarian and erratic. Finally, in Kosovo the US carried out an air bombing campaign against the Serbs, later followed by ground troops only after Milosevic had backed down. This was a success in that it ended whatever genocide was going on, but now the tables have turned and the Albanians are now opressing the Serbs. Orvis concluded that two major lessons can be learned from the Clinton administration's military interventions. For one, if the United States wants to be able to ensure democracy and peace around the world, it has to be willing to commit ground troops and suffer casualities in order for any such intervention to be effective. Secondly, we must recognize that no one in the world, including the US, knows how exactly to "nation build" in the wake of a crisis.

Professor of Government David Rivera, whose research interests focus on international relations and Russian politics, spoke about the effectiveness of the Clinton administrations dealing with the post-Cold War, democratizing Russia. He said that Clinton certainly succeeded in keeping the Cold War over by helping Russia maintain its fledgling democratic and market institutions. However, there are those in the international relations community who criticize the Clinton administration for pushing rapid Westernization and for continuing to support Boris Yeltsin as president even when his regime was authoritarian. From the perspective of "real politik," Rivera said, supporting Yeltsin served US interests and was therefore the correct choice. Rivera also believes that supporting Yeltsin was in fact the best bet to create democracy in Russia. There is evidence which shows that the institutions of democracy in Russia vastly improved from the end of the 1980s to the end of the 1990s, and that Russia has done better at establishing democracy than many of the other former Soviet Socialist republics. Yeltsin's voluntary transfer of power, though slightly calcuated to ensure that his chosen successor would have power, was also a sign of improved democratic processes in Russia. Also, Rivera pointed out that the institutions of democracy have declined since the end of the Clinton/Yeltsin era, with President Putin decreasing freedom of the press and continuing the war in Chechnya. Relatively speaking, therefore, Boris Yeltsin was good for democracy, and it was correct of the Clinton administration to support him.

After the panelists concluded their talks, History Professor Doug Ambrose moderated a question and answer session with members of the audience. The discussion followed up on the panelists' talks as well as touching on some other issues including US policy in China and Afghanistan.

-- by Caroline O'Shea '07

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